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Link: Android?s full-disk encryption just got much weaker?here?s why | Ars Technica
Privacy advocates take note: Android's full-disk encryption just got dramatically easier to defeat on devices that use chips from semiconductor maker Qualcomm, thanks to new research that reveals several methods to extract crypto keys off of a locked handset.
A blog post published Thursday revealed that in stark contrast to the iPhone's iOS, Qualcomm-powered Android devices store the disk encryption keys in software. That leaves the keys vulnerable to a variety of attacks that can pull a key off a device. From there, the key can be loaded onto a server cluster, field-programmable gate array, or supercomputer that has been optimized for super-fast password cracking.
Since the key resides in software, it likely can be extracted using other vulnerabilities that have yet to be made public. Beyond hacks, Beniamini said the design makes it possible for phone manufacturers to assist law enforcement agencies in unlocking an encrypted device. Since the key is available to TrustZone, the hardware makers can simply create and sign a TrustZone image that extracts what are known as the keymaster keys. Those keys can then be flashed to the target device.
"That's significantly different than how iOS works," Dan Guido, an expert in mobile device encryption and the founder and CEO of security consultancy Trail of Bits, told Ars. "What it means is that now you trust a second party, you trust somebody who built the software that holds the key. Maybe people didn't realize that before, that it's not just Google that can mess around with the software on your phone, but it's also [Google partners], and it's in a very significant way."
"The way Apple builds their phone is they actually build that UID key into the silicon of the device so even if they can push a software update they can never actually extract it from the device short of using an electron microscope or something like that," Green explained. "It sounds like in the Qualcomm TrustZone, that's not true."
According to a comment left in response to Thursday's blog post, the lead developer of the freely available Hashcat password-cracking program is exploring the possibility of building in support for extracted disk-encryption keys. This would streamline attacks once a key has been extracted.
Privacy advocates take note: Android's full-disk encryption just got dramatically easier to defeat on devices that use chips from semiconductor maker Qualcomm, thanks to new research that reveals several methods to extract crypto keys off of a locked handset.
A blog post published Thursday revealed that in stark contrast to the iPhone's iOS, Qualcomm-powered Android devices store the disk encryption keys in software. That leaves the keys vulnerable to a variety of attacks that can pull a key off a device. From there, the key can be loaded onto a server cluster, field-programmable gate array, or supercomputer that has been optimized for super-fast password cracking.
Since the key resides in software, it likely can be extracted using other vulnerabilities that have yet to be made public. Beyond hacks, Beniamini said the design makes it possible for phone manufacturers to assist law enforcement agencies in unlocking an encrypted device. Since the key is available to TrustZone, the hardware makers can simply create and sign a TrustZone image that extracts what are known as the keymaster keys. Those keys can then be flashed to the target device.
"That's significantly different than how iOS works," Dan Guido, an expert in mobile device encryption and the founder and CEO of security consultancy Trail of Bits, told Ars. "What it means is that now you trust a second party, you trust somebody who built the software that holds the key. Maybe people didn't realize that before, that it's not just Google that can mess around with the software on your phone, but it's also [Google partners], and it's in a very significant way."
"The way Apple builds their phone is they actually build that UID key into the silicon of the device so even if they can push a software update they can never actually extract it from the device short of using an electron microscope or something like that," Green explained. "It sounds like in the Qualcomm TrustZone, that's not true."
According to a comment left in response to Thursday's blog post, the lead developer of the freely available Hashcat password-cracking program is exploring the possibility of building in support for extracted disk-encryption keys. This would streamline attacks once a key has been extracted.